

# *Remapping Bolivia*



## *Introduction* New Cartographies of Knowledge and Struggle

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The election of Evo Morales to the presidency of Bolivia in 2005 was a critical and historic moment of political and cultural transformation in the country. At the head of a party called the Movement to Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo, MAS), Morales, coca farmer, peasant union leader, and Aymara Bolivian, became the first indigenous president of the country.<sup>1</sup> By sociohistorical (rather than biological) criteria, he is the first indigenous president in the history of the Americas. But Morales did not emerge from an “ethnic” movement. Backed by lower- and middle-class leftist, nationalist, indigenous, and labor organizations, Morales led a broad-based democratic challenge to a political system long dominated by entrenched elite parties. His election brought to an end two decades of free-market or “neoliberal” economic policies that had privatized state industries, deregulated production, increased labor flexibility, and encouraged foreign investment in natural resource extraction and exportation. After neoliberalism, the indigenous- and social movement–led rise of Morales is yielding a deep rethinking and remapping of Bolivia into what is being called a “plurinational” state.

These emerging changes create new expectations for Bolivian social movements and new analytical challenges for researchers. The free-market era had seen an official turn toward interculturalism as a strategy for “including” the country’s long subordinated indigenous majority. As many analysts noted, interculturalism across the Americas was a social movement demand that was instrumental in making claims for human, cultural, and indigenous rights (Gustafson 2002; Postero 2006; Rappaport 2005; Sieder 2002; Warren 1998; Warren and Jackson 2002). Yet, as state policy, neoliberal interculturalism as a managed form of “inclusion” did not radically deepen democracy or decolonize state forms. Furthermore, free-market policies exacerbated poverty and deepened inequalities. The array of social movements supporting Evo Morales and his political party thus represented an alternative set of visions that have now taken the fore. These include a nationalist turn toward state sovereignty and natural resource control aimed at state-led wealth redistribution and industrialization policies. A new constitution approved in 2009 moves beyond interculturalism to the idea of plurinationalism, with explicit support for robust indigenous rights and forms of indigenous self-determination or “autonomy.” Beyond interculturalism, the constitution and government now back the idea of “decolonization”—of education, the economy, law, the state, and society—promising to dismantle centuries of racialized and racist cultural, legal, and political-economic state form and practice. It is unclear whether Morales and the Movement to Socialism (MAS) party can meet the rising expectations generated by this ambitious “democratic cultural and political revolution” that is euphemistically called the “process of change” (*proceso de cambio*) in the country. Still, Bolivia has embarked upon a series of momentous transformations that call for new forms of political and intellectual activism and practice.

This volume, *Remapping Bolivia: Resources, Territory, and Indigeneity in a Plurinational State*, examines this rapidly changing historical moment by focusing on the emerging cultural politics of territoriality and indigeneity in relation to state change and globalized struggles over Bolivia’s natural resources. We do not pretend to offer prescriptive policy suggestions, nor simplistic evaluations of Bolivia’s current moment. Rather, the chapters that follow seek to capture emerging trajectories of change tied to two broad shifts in the country: one, the turn toward a state-led economic model based on aggressive natural resource extraction and, two, the shift toward a pluralist vision of decolonization and plurinational governance that radically alters the official and unofficial grammars of race, rights, identity, and territory in the country. For indigenous and nonindigenous Bolivians alike, the cultural and political upheaval has certainly unsettled existing symbolic

orders and opened the hope for new possibilities of material change. There also emerges a new, complex, and often conflictive geopolitics of space that involves remappings of territorial orders across multiple scales, from the microspaces of daily life in the homes, markets, and streets of the cities to macroregional struggles over jurisdiction, resource control, and sovereignty. These are struggles tied to material concerns entangled with competing cultural and epistemic models for reshaping political, social, and economic orders. If territorial orders during the neoliberal era were reshaped to facilitate trade liberalization and market-oriented accumulation (with labor flexibility and rural dispossession), the reconstitution of a sovereign developmentalist state and the recognition of the country's indigenous majority have fueled a new array of remappings emerging both from official policy and from social movement struggle. In this volume, we explore these remappings, which are changing both the shape of cultural politics and the direction of research agendas for the country.

Through case studies of emerging territorial and cultural-political dynamics around the country, our purpose is to analyze, critique, and establish points of intellectual and political solidarity with the wider process of change underway in the country. There is clearly a sense in our collective work that after more than three decades of free-market neoliberal reformism, the “process of change” offers much promise and hope. Yet, this does not suggest a naïve embrace of the MAS regime, nor of “Evo,” as he is affectionately known in Bolivia. The politics of change are not as simple as being “for” or “against” indigenous rights, nor even for or against “neoliberal” or “state-centric” development models on the global capitalist stage. The MAS regime faces intense opposition from right-wing business elites, especially those tied to agribusiness in and around the city of Santa Cruz (and their backers in the US foreign policy circles). It also faces criticism from left-wing sectors dissatisfied with the pace of change. Although the nationalist turn to recover state control of natural resource wealth was widely popular—and the flood of new rents to the state treasury circulates to assuage opposition from all sides—the turn to indigenous rights has been widely questioned, even by inner circles of the MAS regime. As observers also point out in Ecuador and Peru, Bolivia's efforts to re-capitalize the country through natural resource extraction have generated tensions with indigenous movements and local community organizers, potentially creating new ecological and social violences that replicate the rapaciousness of the neoliberal turn (Bebbington 2009; Farthing 2009). At the outset, then, we take a position of critical solidarity, avoiding the reductionist readings of Bolivia as simply populist, ethnicist, or resource nationalist. We seek to capture the fluidity and complexity of these changes. At the same time, we support the

deeper projects of transformation that go beyond Evo Morales and the temporal conjuncture of MAS party rule.

Globally, Bolivia has garnered much deserved attention as an icon of social movement and popular resistance and of indigenous struggle. Yet, although unique, Bolivia also reflects a conflict between a global onslaught on natural resources by wealthier countries—including Europe and the United States but also new powers such as India, China, Russia, and Brazil—and efforts by national movements to reconstitute sovereignty as something more than an instrument of extraction in the wake of the destructive impacts of neoliberalism. If, from within Bolivia, there is a great reservoir of visions about progressive transformation for the future, from without, the country is often represented merely as one of many troubled, poverty-stricken regions marked by “underdevelopment” (and, paradoxically, lots of resources). Such countries are framed in the wealthy imaginary as targets—with their internal histories and movements as “obstacles”—for access to resources. Long-time Bolivianists and Bolivians now see the country thrust into the media imaginary of the wealthy North as a site of “lithium” dreams or as merely another peripheral country treated as a place needing “help” to “manage” its national and natural resources (that is, open access to them from the North).<sup>2</sup>

What is at stake in Bolivia? Beyond lithium that has excited Japan and France, iron ore in the country's east is disputed by China, Venezuela, and India. Minerals in the high Andes are targeted by France, Japan, Canada, Australia, and the United States. Land in the east is already under significant control—via soy marketing and export—by Monsanto, ADM, and South American soy capital. With high global prices of crude oil and excessive use of fossil fuels, soy and sugar lands in Bolivia are now imagined globally as a new opportunity for biodiesel production. Water resources in the Amazon basin of the east (in stark contrast to the crisis of water scarcity in the Andean west) are slated to be dammed and turbinized for electricity production for Brazilian energy consumption. Conversely, water scarcity has yielded the threat of “market-based” solutions that attract foreign capital eager to profit from human need—and against human right. And, central at the moment, the immense natural gas reserves along the Andean foothills are coveted by Brazil and Argentina, with Russian, British, American, and Spanish capital, with their own dreams of gas liquefaction and export to Europe or the United States. The global onslaught has not been slowed by nationalization, as detractors have shrilly argued. What is more significant is whether and how these resources might contribute to more equitable development patterns and democratizing processes without yielding new socioenvironmental crises or new authoritarian or militarist regimes. It is in this wider context that we

take a critical stance of solidarity with the process of change in Bolivia, arguing that Bolivia's struggle to sustain its own forms of democratic governance against global and national legacies of coloniality may offer lessons in a world marked by intensifying lines of racialized and gendered class inequality, the effects of market-led exclusionary growth patterns, and the social and ecological effects of environmental degradation. Our purpose is thus to explore the promise and contradictions of a wide array of social movement efforts to *vivir bien* (live well) with sovereignty and self-determination.

Indigeneity—its contested meanings, its divergent expressions, and its implications in relation to the reordering of citizenship, territory, and state form—is at the heart of this text. Indigeneity not only represents the presence of “ethnic” politics but also offers a cultural and knowledge-centered challenge to conventional Western paradigms through which state transformations are debated. Old debates pitting the state against the market as key development actors are now confronted by a third field of epistemic, territorial, and ideological challenges to development and the state itself. With rethinkings and remappings shaped by indigenous philosophical tenets, cultural ideas, and social models of territorialized governance, the question becomes not merely whether indigenous rights might be recognized, but how the turn toward a more robust recognition of indigeneity might yield creative national transformations in law, economics, and social relations. Again, this is not to suggest an acritical embrace of all things “indigenous”—since indigeneity bears its own risks of fundamentalism, commodification, or simply, as with neoliberal interculturalism, masking stasis with the rhetoric of change. Rather, this is to suggest that the cultural and epistemological reservoir of difference in Bolivia—now exercised as a decolonizing thrust—might yield ideas about pluralist democracy in a world hungry for scarce natural resources. Our “remapping” of Bolivia is not, then, a colonialist effort to prescribe change, nor a romantic embrace of indigenous utopia, but an attempt to engage in dialogue about possibilities in a complex scenario of political and social transformation ridden with tensions and frictions.

The history of this collection has some bearing on its form and content. *Remapping Bolivia* originated at a conference organized by Fabricant at Northwestern University in 2008. The conference, “Decolonizing the Nation, (Re) Imagining the City: Indigenous Peoples Mapping a New Terrain,” brought together US and Bolivian scholars and indigenous intellectuals to cross the North–South divide (between Bolivian and predominantly North American researchers) and disciplinary boundaries (between anthropologists and their colleagues in geography, urban planning, literature, and political science). This volume builds on the conference to explore interdisciplinary research trajectories articulated with political processes in Bolivia. Working

largely through ground-level, ethnographically situated viewpoints, this book embraces engaged, collaborative, and activist research. We thus acknowledge and activate the links between academic and grassroots modes of knowledge production and cultural-political transformation (Hale 2006b; Rappaport 2005, 2008). This volume includes work rooted in the ethnographic traditions of anthropology (Fabricant's chapter 7, Gustafson's chapter 8) in dialogue with urban planning (Kirshner's chapter 5; Revilla's chapter 6), literature, history, and postcolonial studies (Garcés's chapter 3, Soruco Sologuren's chapter 4), and sociology (Mamani Ramirez's chapter 2). We have also included interludes—called “Visions from the Ground”—to destabilize the often monologic form of research dissemination. These segments capture indigenous and other Bolivian voices speaking of their ongoing struggles for and against change in the country.

This dialogic and reciprocal style of engagement between knowledge and political work also characterizes movement and intellectual practice in Bolivia, a phenomenon we seek to emulate here. The sometimes rowdy embrace of polyvocality is a direct challenge to the depoliticizing turn of the neoliberal paradigm, as well as the reductionist embrace of formulaic models, methods, and theories that has taken over much academic labor, missing, in the process, the chance for deeper and transformative understandings of cultural politics. Here we eschew an attempt to reduce Bolivia to a singular narrative, while critically embracing a range of epistemic, discursive, and historical reserves that characterize Bolivian modes of reimagining and debating change. This dialogic, if often conflictive, embrace of epistemic creativity—much like the Andean ritual of the *tinku*<sup>3</sup>—may, as many of our contributors highlight, represent one of the country's most significant resources as it moves toward the future.

In more conventional academic terms, the volume is situated within the anthropology of the state, social movements, and globalization that focuses on the cultural politics of territory and nature as contested spaces constituted through struggle. This shift moves to reground social and cultural analyses spatially and materially in an era in which resources and territoriality are returning (or at least reappearing in our research) to occupy a center point in the study of power and meaning. This is not a claim to novelty, but rather a suggestion that questions of identity, subjectivity, and the body—and assumptions about neoliberal globalization's erasure of categories such as state, nation, class, and place—have dominated the study of power in recent years. Yet, in this era of widening inequalities and intensified resource struggles, we must move to reconnect these questions in a more explicit way without returning to crude materialist or rationalist models or their inverse, a culturalist or ethnicist myopia, to understand what is going

on in places like Bolivia. By the same token, the wider Andeanist frame for producing knowledge about Bolivia is clearly no longer sufficient for speaking of the cultural politics of indigeneity or of Bolivia itself. Several of the chapters here explore the changing positionality of indigeneity in Bolivia and the shifting meanings of Andeanness within the country.

Given the new role of the state in economic production and redistribution, this focus on territoriality and indigeneity is situated within consideration of what might be tentatively called a post-neoliberal era. As a descriptor of free-market policies, techniques, and processes that have entrenched themselves deeply in people's lives and in state and economic forms, "neoliberal" has taken prominence in academic and political discourse. We realize that merely labeling Bolivia "post-neoliberal" is at best hopeful, because neoliberal practices coexist with nationalist extractivism and state-led developmentalism elsewhere. However, scholars working in places such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia have recently defined a post-neoliberal order as "a hybrid state formation that has mounted certain challenges to the neoliberal paradigm but which remains subject to the internal and external constraints of global capitalism" (S. Fernandes 2010:23). In Bolivia, this is marked by social movement efforts to reground sovereignty, refound the state, and remap Bolivia, as well as by our own attempts to trace and understand these processes. Together, these chapters suggest new directions for anthropologists of Bolivia and beyond as neoliberalism gives way to new modes of social struggle, redistributive and egalitarian utopias, reactionary violence, and emergent models of pluralist statecraft.

The sections that follow introduce the concerns of this volume across three conceptual fields: the remaking of Andeanism as a marker of scholarship, polity, and indigeneity in Bolivia; the articulation of resources, territorialities, and movements involved in the remaking of the state; and the rethinking of knowledge production as collective and collaborative engagement.

## Remapping Andeanism: Between Indigeneity, Mestizaje, and Race

The contested meanings of the Andes and the Andean—*lo andino*—deeply inflect the academic imaginary and the public politics of mobilization in Bolivia. In academia, Bolivia has long been positioned in an Andean slot, such that those who work and study there are assumed to be Andeanists and, as far as politics and indigenous issues go, most research has concentrated on the Andean Quechua and Aymara peoples. This reflects the demographic centrality of the Quechua and Aymara, who together number more than four million, as well as their political and historic centrality in indigenous and

popular movement struggles and Bolivian nation-making. Yet, Andeanism also reflects a longer tradition of ethnological area studies that have sought to understand peoples in relation to ecologies, often in deterministic ways, and have deemphasized dynamics of wider political-economic change. Though much of Bolivia is, in fact, Amazonia—and a good part is in the Chaco—this culturalist Andeanization of Bolivia has left a lasting imprint on internal cultural politics and academic paradigms and continues to influence area-centric models of policy making and analysis.<sup>3</sup>

In anthropology, the rethinking of Andeanism began with Orin Starn's (1992) essay, which argued that theoretical concerns with cultural phenomena such as dual organization, the *ayllu* (community), ritual, and the supposed durability of timeless cosmological and social orders had generated a kind of anthropological blindness to broader political-economic processes, exchanges, and relationships.<sup>4</sup> What has since resulted, in some ways, is a retreat from Andeanism and locality and movement toward the study of transnationalisms and politics of various sorts. To highlight but a few, these studies include accounts of transnationalized Andean communities (Bigenho 2002; Colloredo-Mansfeld 1999; Orta 2004); rural–urban and transnational migration (Goldstein 2004; Pribilsky 2007); and of late, the rise of Andean movements engaged with transnational development and state reform (among others, Becker 2008; Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009; García 2005; Goodale 2008; Lazar 2008; Lucero 2008). This burgeoning work transcends a traditional focus on community life and has opened a vibrant, interdisciplinary space bridging anthropological concerns with cultural politics and wider debates on citizenship, pluralist democracy, inequality, and the state. As a precursor to this volume, this remaking of *lo andino* has added complexity to our understandings of indigeneity in Bolivia and beyond. Even so, as we explore here, uniquely Andean symbols, epistemologies, and social forms are still central, perhaps more than ever, to the remapping of Bolivian political spaces and imaginaries.

Yet, there are two dimensions of the rethinking of *lo andino* that have yet to be explored. The first entails articulating *lo andino* analytically with the “other” parts of Andean countries like Bolivia. The Amazonian and Chaco lowlands are now, especially in light of the rush on resources such as oil and gas, taking a central role in the political and cultural dynamics of Andean-centered Bolivian (and Peruvian and Ecuadoran) statecraft. We highlight articulations across these spaces—national, regional, ethnolinguistic, and social—acknowledging a wider history of (pluri)national state formation that has long bridged arbitrary geographic divides. A second and closely related issue involves examining the reaction to *lo andino* within Bolivia, a phenomenon quite distinct from the comfortably distanced



squabbles of academics. In both cases, there emerge articulations of conflict and engagement that involve rethinking and remapping lo andino in relation to a wider panoply of places, peoples, and politics in Bolivia.

This latter point was most abruptly brought to international attention by an unlikely agent: Miss Bolivia 2004, Gabriela Oviedo, a celebrated daughter of the city of Santa Cruz. During that year's Miss Universe pageant in Quito, Ecuador, the otherwise elegant beauty queen resignified the Andean character of her country for the world by answering journalists' queries in this way:

*Unfortunately, people who don't know Bolivia very much think that we are all just Indians from the west side of the country, that is, La Paz ...poor people and very short people and Indian people. I'm from the other side of the country, the east side, and it's not cold, it's very hot, and we are tall and we are white people and we know English, so all that misconception that Bolivia is only an Andean country, it's wrong. [Wall 2004]*

Dressed in an outfit with indigenous (non-Andean) Guaraní motifs during the national costume portion of the pageant, Oviedo, perhaps unwittingly, embodied a phenomenon that we explore here: the racialized rejection of a certain kind of indigeneity—that of the Andean Aymara and Quechua—by the eastern regionalist opposition to the MAS; and the appropriation and subalternization of another kind of local indigeneity, that of the Guaraní, Chiquitano, and other native peoples of eastern Bolivia. This claim for a local kind of *mestizaje* with “our” Indians but not “those” Andean ones (and its attendant racism) unsettles simplistic readings of indigeneity and race (Lowrey 2006). For the right-wing elite of the east, the rejection of all things Andean helps fuel the reaction against the MAS, seen as neither Bolivian nor national, but as Andean, or *Colla* (or *Kolla*, referring to people of Andean origin; see figure 7, in the section “Envisioning Bolivia”). This reaction against lo andino and the appropriation of local indigeneity serves the interest of regional business elites and their ultimately anti-indigenous political projects in eastern Bolivia. Illustrative of this stance, whereas indigenous intellectuals speak of decolonizing the country by dismantling racialized inequality, reactionary intellectuals of the east speak of decolonization as a need to “de-Andeanize” eastern Bolivia. What is clear is that contested meanings of indigeneity—as both a positive and negative referent—take center stage in attempts to contest and change the exercise of state sovereignty, nation, and state.

Much of this new politics is interpreted as a conflict between the central government in La Paz and the agro-industrial city of Santa Cruz in the eastern lowlands. With the post-World War II economic boom in eastern

Bolivia, Santa Cruz took on increased importance. Today, much like conservative Texans, fueled by oil profits and an exaggerated sense of their individualist origins and nation-like particularity, Santa Cruz's civic elites—with the backing of middle and lower classes sparked by fears of insecurity—are at the forefront of the challenge against the nationalist-indigenous turn. As scholars of Bolivia who did not work in the Andes have observed, people of eastern Bolivia have long been unsettled by Andean migrations from the highlands to the lowlands (Fifer 1970; Gill 1987; Heath, Erasmus, and Buechler 1969; Henkel 1982; Stearman 1985). Yet, only now, with the election of an indigenous president hailing from the Andes, the long simmering regionalist sentiment in Santa Cruz has revived past dreams of separatism that not only reject *andinocentrismo* but also question the foundations of the Bolivian state itself.

In this context, the figure of the colla (Andean) invader is represented by some in the east as an *avasallador* (subjugator, invader, dispossessor). The once quietly cursed is now publicly denigrated (see figure 8). This reaction to the Andean is, at its crudest, an expression of racialized fear about public space and jobs that often manifests itself through violence. Yet, this anti-Andean reaction also has an intellectual expression. Editorialists and writers opposed to the MAS project are analyzing Andean heritage—and its contemporary bearers, the Aymara and Quechua—as subjects and spaces culturally rooted in authoritarian, bureaucratic, and antidemocratic matrices bequeathed by the Incan and Spanish empires and a hostile natural environment (see, for example, Mansilla 2004). This reading recovers outdated culturalist and ecological (and racist) idioms of traditional ethnology. Against the “low-oxygen” Andes, deemed detrimental to cognitive development, such works describe the places and peoples of the east, especially Santa Cruz, in part because of its tropical climate, as centers of liberal, entrepreneurial, pioneer-like citizens, the vanguard of Bolivian modernity and democracy. This erudite discourse—ostensibly liberal yet ultimately racist—revives a longer Bolivian intellectual tradition that denigrated Andean indigeneity and racial mixing (Arguedas 1982[1910]). The reaction to *lo andino* is now politically productive as a reaction against redistributive nationalism and popular democracy and the rise of alternative models of indigenous territoriality. Anti-Andean racism lends support to the idea of sub-state models of *regional* governance, a neo-neoliberal strategy for localizing and maintaining market-oriented resource extraction in articulation with transnational capital (Escobar 2008; Gustafson 2006).

Although the MAS is not an ethnic party and Evo Morales is more versed in labor union struggle than the language of indigenous revindication, the MAS project is deeply imprinted by Andeanist scholarship and discourse.

This support for Andean philosophy, knowledge, and languages is denigrated by critics as a facile *pachamamismo* for its embrace of the *Pachamama*, or Mother Earth. But it is here that the decolonization of public reason and the official embrace of *lo andino* energize and transform philosophical debates about law, rights, and polity. The *Pachamama* is now part of the new constitution, and Andean idioms of reciprocity, exchange, solidarity, and complementarity are making their way into a multitude of official texts and discourses. We engage this bifurcation created by both positive and negative reifications of *lo andino* and seek to transcend it here by highlighting articulations rather than fixating on putative cultural and geographic dichotomies.

The contest over *lo andino* and the conflict between tropical east and Andean west are thus more complex than an overt rejection of indigeneity, evidenced in the beauty queen's stylized Guaraní dress and renewed talk about *mestizaje* as an alternative to the indigenous turn. As in Guatemala, indigenous resurgence is confronted by the intensification of discourses about *mestizaje*, a supposed process of racial and cultural mixing that has yielded neither Indians nor Whites but *mestizos* as the model of the national citizen. *Mestizaje* discourses emerge from both the left and the right in Bolivia today. The idea of *mestizaje* ostensibly embraces indigeneity and critiques Euro-Bolivian privilege. However, the notion of mixing ultimately reaffirms the primacy and superiority of European and "Western" things and ideas in governance, mobilizes an implicitly racist biological model of race, and denies particularity of *rights or difference to those Bolivians long subjugated as indios* (del Valle Escalante 2009). One banner hung by the women's civic chamber in Santa Cruz for the city's two-hundredth anniversary read in late 2010, "We are a mestizo race, without lament or rancor." Yet, this seemingly inclusive call to *mestizaje* marks a refusal to recognize entrenched privileges long constructed in opposition to the category of indigeneity and indicates a refusal to recognize indigenous peoples—as peoples—themselves.

At the national level, *mestizaje* is also being revived by conservative intellectuals as a means of undermining the epistemological stance of indigeneity and the decolonizing turn. For instance, conservatives have used census and polling strategies and data to argue that Bolivia is a majority mestizo country (Toranzo 2008). The 1992 census, based on languages spoken, yielded a count of around 60 percent of the country speaking an indigenous language, hence the oft heard assertion (with which we agree) that indigenous peoples are a majority in the country (Albó 2008). However, a 1996 poll by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), similar to a later study headed by a Vanderbilt University team, allowed people to refer to themselves as "mestizo" or "white." This poll generated results suggesting that Bolivia was 16 percent indigenous, 67 percent mestizo, and 17 percent

white (Toranzo 2008:37). In 2001, the census allowed people to self-identify with a particular ethnolinguistic group (Quechua, Guaraní, Aymara, or other), again generating a response of roughly 62 percent indigenous. Though linguistic origins and self-ascription tend to affirm the predominance of indigeneity as a marker of identity, it is not our purpose to enter this debate over the fixing of categories (for a rebuttal, see Albó 2008; Mamani Ramirez, chapter 2, this volume). This would mean engaging the spurious assertion that if indigenous peoples are minorities, then their claims to rights should somehow have less importance. What is illuminating is how racial anxieties are translated into new battles over public categories. The renewed embrace of *mestizaje* and now frequent assertions that Bolivia suffers from “reverse racism” (indigenous peoples against nonindigenous) suggests what Hale (2006a) refers to as a “preemptive strike” against indigenous claims and the antiracist decolonizing agenda. These seething debates highlight disputes within and against the MAS project about whether and how Bolivian “indigeneity” offers a platform for remaking the Bolivian state, a question we explore herein.

Amid these debates, most indigenous movements generally argue that it is the state, not indigenous peoples, that must change and adapt to reality. Indigenous movements from across the country are already reshaping the state in articulation with new and emergent expressions of indigenous and popular (class-based) movements of peoples displaced and dispossessed in rural and urban peripheries and city centers. These movements are at times rooted in conventionally understood indigenous territorialities marked by sociocultural and linguistic particularity (especially in the lowlands) and at times based in a more diffuse claim to indigeneity tied to a sense of popular subaltern belonging. Along with a long-standing presence of indigenous Bolivians in cities large and small, this complicates conventional readings of indigeneity as fixed in specific, usually “rural” territorialities (and cultures or cosmologies). It calls for creative thinking about how legal frameworks of indigenous rights designed for minorities might work in a country in which those with reasonable claims to be indigenous are in the majority. There are also alliances and tensions between Andean and lowland indigenous organizations, migrant settlers, and farmers’ unions that complicate any facile reading of an indigenous agenda. Though key alliances led to the new land reform, there is now a split between small farmer settlers who seek individual landholdings and lowland indigenous peoples demanding collective territorialities—often in the same regions.<sup>5</sup> The political and intellectual work behind the rise of MAS has involved, in large part, the strategic articulation of these diverse indigenous expressions with popular movements and a nationalist and redistributive agenda. This process relies on decolonizing

notions of identity—from races to peoples—while maintaining a national frame of a sovereign national *pueblo* (people) that highlights the language of class struggle. This decolonizing view of indigeneity (see Garcés, chapter 3, this volume) stands in stark contrast to the efforts of the conservative intelligentsia, who resuscitate colonial idioms of race, Andean primitiveness, and mestizaje to selectively contain or reject “their” and “other” kinds of Indians in defense of existing orders of status, inequality, and territory.

Without reviving the culturalist models of the past, there is thus a case to be made that “Andean” cultural traditions and idioms continue to shape rural and urban life and public politics across Bolivia, with *lo andino* mobilized in positive and negative terms as part of the changing public sphere of politics, law, and culture. What are the implications of this discussion for representing and contextualizing Bolivia and its multiple forms of indigeneity and other emergent political identities? One response, attempting to redirect the Starn critique, has been to suggest a return to the role of cultural symbolism in the shaping of a deterritorialized, neo-indigenous cosmopolitanism (Goodale 2009). This envisions indigeneity as no longer rooted in territorial fixity (or even non-Western alterity) but as expressed in a hybrid “cosmopolitan” liberalism that transcends both the class-based utopias of the past and the decolonizing epistemological utopias of the present. Yet, this liberal reframing fails to capture the intensely grounded ways that collective indigenous and popular agendas are not merely problems of individual freedom and identity, but of unfinished historical and epistemological struggles that entail territorial reconfigurations, radical structural and symbolic changes, and the literal and figurative “remapping” of the state.

On the other hand, some academic approaches to cultural and political change in Bolivia have embraced a newly politicized stance linked to the “decolonial” option. This idea—evidenced in some of the chapters in this volume—argues that rethinking the state entails transcending not only neoliberal modernization of the right but also the Westernizing and homogenizing mindset of a traditional statist left (see Arnold and Yapita 2006; Gustafson 2009a; Mignolo 2005). Yet, this decolonial option also brings risks of a new kind of essentializing that reduces indigenous complexities to certain epistemic tenets—ontological predation, communitarian reciprocity, non-Western cosmologies, and so forth. This reflects the discourse of some sectors of the state and indigenous movements—as with the romanticizing of *pachamamismo*—as a kind of catch-all solution to the ecological and social challenges of capitalism. Although decolonizing Western categories is crucial, essentialism of indigenous knowledge is not a useful way of engaging the complexities of Bolivian indigenous subjectivities and politics.<sup>6</sup> We embrace the creative potentiality of indigenous epistemologies, but we are critically

wary of attempts to transform indigenous cultural alterity into instrumental ideological doctrine. To do so is to risk contributing to new forms of reductionism that echo—in the name of critique—the grammars of colonial and patriarchal violence and exclusion itself.

Against attempting to redefine the Indian—whether as the hybrid cosmopolitan, the revolutionary militant, or the telluric native—what we seek is a vocabulary in which culturally and politically significant practices marked by a claim to “indigeneity” become imbricated in socially, politically, and economically salient struggles. This approach does not seek to reinscribe a timelessness to cultural forms or to define the indigenous, Andean or otherwise, but to trace recontextualizations and deployments in distinct political moments. We also seek to understand the ways in which these real and imagined cultural forms and practices inform material issues linked to resource redistribution. This includes questions such as the centrality of the ayllu and its reimagining in highland and now lowland settings in the context of land reform (see Albro 2005; Fabricant, chapter 7, this volume); the redeployment of cultural models of reciprocity and complementarity in the new constitution and in notions of indigenous autonomy (Garcés, chapter 3, Fabricant, chapter 7, Gustafson, chapter 8, this volume); the rethinking of models of economy, exchange, and nationalist resource control that shape the work of Bolivian and indigenous intellectuals (Gustafson, chapter 8, this volume); the rethinking of practices of citizenship and democracy in relation to hybrid cultural models (Lazar 2008; Revilla, chapter 6, this volume) and the prospects and risks involved in proposing a path to decolonization that highlights (or absolutely denies) the “indigenization” of the country (Mamani Ramirez, chapter 2, Soruco Sologuren, chapter 4, this volume). It is more productive to view Andean and other indigenous cultural matrices not as restrictive or deterministic frames but as knowledge networks that are immersed in movement, repositioning, and rearticulation with a range of reterritorializing projects and other knowledge forms.

This moves our discussion toward a more grounded yet translocally networked, rather than localist, understanding of cultural production as political practice, which allows us to focus on intersections between cultural production, territorializing processes, and multiscalar political-economic transformations and articulations (Escobar 2008; Tsing 2004). This also entails rethinking context, to delink geography and culture from their connectedness in racialist, evolutionary, and essentialist forms, while leaving room for the emergence of territorially specific, collective political projects, indigenous and otherwise. These projects produce authenticity and legitimacy, not by virtue of replication of the past but through processes of political articulation, negotiation, and exchange in the present.

## Remapping Resource Politics: Between Dispossession and the New Extractivism

Political geographers have suggested that recent resource conflicts are the result of long histories of uneven geographic development. These can be interpreted as the product of a differentiated diffusion process from the center that leaves behind residuals from preceding eras. Harvey, in *The New Imperialism* (2003), reworks Marx's fundamental construct of "primitive accumulation," the process of forced dispossession and transformation of modes of production, as in the British enclosure movement or the European conquest of Latin America, which enabled early capitalist growth. He describes this process as longer-term accumulation by dispossession endemic to all capitalist expansion. This encapsulates the contemporary moment of the triumph of exchange over use value, or in other words, the commodification and privatization of land and forceful expulsion of peasant populations. Such accumulation-by-dispossession cycles have specific effects in shifting national and global spatialities (di Leonardo 2008; N. Smith 1990).

In the case of Bolivia, contemporary scholars have used this framing to understand the emergence of movements against dispossession to reclaim control over natural resources such as water and gas from transnational corporations (Spronk and Webber 2007). A wealth of popular and academic scholarship emerged after the "Water War" of 2000, exploring how and why the privatization of water sparked new forms of politics across identitarian, class, and regional distinctions.<sup>7</sup> What emerged were understandings of distinctive strategies of movement building that differed from a previous generation of organizing and academic thinking concerned with privileging class or ethnic identity. As Albro (2005) and Olivera and Lewis (2004) have noted, the Water Wars effectively mobilized a discourse centering on the defense of the "traditional use and distribution of water" as a collective cultural right based on *usos y costumbres* (uses and customs). In this case, Andean cultural identities, in a complex and networked way, became a critical frame of reference for reclaiming water as part of a wider trans-Andean commons. Similarly, what might be called the "coca" wars, waged against the US-backed plans to eradicate coca in the 1990s—which effectively threatened to dispossess peoples already dispossessed from their prior labor as miners—had mobilized the symbolism of a "millenarian leaf" against imperialism, conflicts that ultimately propelled Evo Morales to the status of national hero and, later, president.

Three and a half years after the Water Wars, when former president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada proposed to export Bolivia's gas in a pipeline through Chile, distinct groups, this time centered in the largely Aymara city

of El Alto, came together to resist dispossession and the alienation of resources in the “Gas War” of 2003. Analyses of the Gas War highlighted the ways that local movements articulated around a national frame to recover control over a resource that was seen as the country’s national patrimony (Arbona 2006; Kohl and Farthing 2006). Demands for the nationalization of gas were discursively bundled with other demands, indigenous and otherwise, including calls for the refounding of the country, greater democratization based on new forms of social organization, greater indigenous representation, and the rewriting of the constitution. Importantly, these demands came from the Aymara and Quechua organizations, as well as from urban labor and popular unions, middle classes, and lowland indigenous peoples (Perrault 2006). The nationalization of gas, though questioned by left and right for different reasons and generative of new lines of struggle, appears to be consolidated. But the unfinished debate over the rewriting of the constitution and its implementation in relation to indigenous and other autonomy agendas will be conflictive and complex. It is this unfinished remapping, the jostling between nationalist and indigenous projects against conservative reaction, as well as the ongoing struggle to meet basic daily needs faced by a majority of the country’s population, that will shape the next decades in Bolivia.

Land and gas represent two examples of the friction between an extractive and transnational model of economic development, state-based redistributive agendas, and territorially situated indigenous projects.<sup>8</sup> In a recent essay, Linda Farthing (2009) astutely highlights the essence of this dilemma: on one side of the continuum lies the social and economic pressure to satisfy the country’s immediate needs through extractive industries, and on the other, the environmental and social demands of indigenous movements, NGOs, and certain intellectuals. One environmental organizer describes it thus:

*Just look at the National Development Plan, and even the new constitution passed at the beginning of the year. In some parts of both, a “strong development at whatever cost” orientation predominates, and in others there is more emphasis on protecting resources. [Farthing 2009:29]*

Defending nature—and finding space for robust indigenous projects of self-determination—in a wider battle against a voracious and destructive capitalism has been central to the public discourse of MAS and of Evo Morales (see the interview in the “Visions from the Ground” following this chapter). Yet, with Bolivia positioning itself as a global center for energy and other resources—water, lithium, gas, steel, and soy—wider forces may destabilize the attempt to consolidate an alternative political project already



confronted by local and transnational opposition and internal divisions between productivist nationalism and indigenous decolonization. This volume explores transformations underway as struggles against dispossession arise, articulate, and enter into tension with the new national model of state-led natural resource extraction and growth.

## Remapping and Reterritorializing Identity: Between Locality and Articulation

Work on social movements in the 1990s and 2000s focused primarily on identity. We follow its evolution into the analysis of governmentality, the state, and citizenship by relinking culturally mediated movement agendas with political-economic and reterritorializing processes (see Escobar 2001; Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Lucero 2008; Offen 2003, Postero 2007; Yashar 2005). Several chapters in this volume speak directly to emergent identities that surfaced as a result of the deterritorialization and reterritorialization of rural, mining, and indigenous communities in the wake of neoliberal structural adjustment. The economic restructuring of the 1980s led to the relocation of ex-miners from highland communities and small-scale subsistence farmers from the lowlands to urban peripheral spaces. Migrants found jobs in the expanding informal economy as domestic servants and street vendors and frequently moved in search of employment. The social and economic fragmentation and intensified poverty produced by the reterritorialization of miners and peasants created a difficult environment for union-based organizing. As with the expressions of the Water and Gas Wars, neither the Marxian frames of the once powerful miners' unions nor the varied indigenous positionings of many farming communities proved effective for confronting broader national processes of urban spoilage and marginality, underemployment, and landlessness that affected Bolivians across multiple lines of identity.

On the other hand, the neoliberal disruption and its attendant reforms—most crucially, municipal decentralization, or “Popular Participation” (1994)—led to the emergence of new types of groups that mobilized around territory and space. These territorially based yet not “traditionally” rural or indigenous organizations, such as the Federation of Neighborhood Councils (FEJUVE) in El Alto, the coca-growers' movement (cocaleros) in Cochabamba, and the Landless Movement (MST) of the peasants in Santa Cruz, all multiplied—somewhat paradoxically—in the context of neoliberal municipal decentralization. In contexts like Chapare, pan-municipal alliances around the MAS party as an “instrument” created a platform for propelling Evo Morales to the presidency. In the Andes, municipal politics

yielded new indigenous organizations such as CONAMAQ while positioning older ones in new posts of control over public goods. In the lowlands, the effects were uneven for indigenous peoples, who were often minorities in municipal jurisdictions, though they appropriated in distinct ways the “communal lands of origin” (TCOs) offered by the neoliberal state. Reformers’ intentions during the neoliberal era were to channel demands to the local level in order to reduce pressure on the central government and break up union organizations and frames of contestation that had coordinated past challenges to the state. As Arbona (2008) and Yashar (2005) note, however, the decentralization process had unintended consequences: it created relatively autonomous governance spaces that facilitated the formation of organizational structures focused on territorializing rights—specifically, access to basic services, the right to farm coca, and land as a space for small-scale production.

Thus, a renewed embrace of popular power (from below) merged with ongoing demands for the redistribution of property and rights (from the state, above), prominently including land and the surplus of national resources such as gas. From these new clusters of movement articulation, a wider politics of rearticulating and refounding the state unfolded from the ground up. This entailed a simultaneous embrace of the “local,” in which claims to rights took on an intensely territorial sense, and a tactical and multiscale pursuit of “articulation,” in which a shared recognition of the role of the state—albeit from multiple loci of enunciation—yielded a commitment to processes such as the constitutional assembly and the nationalization of gas. All of the chapters are positioned between these movement processes of localizing territoriality and trans-scalar articulations with and via the state.

Distinct from the struggles of some indigenous movements to defend and recover their traditional or ancestral territorial spaces, entities such as FEJUVE in El Alto, the *gremios* (merchant trade unions) in Santa Cruz, the coca-growers’ movement, and MST become hybrid spaces of displaced and dispossessed peoples, collective organizations through which differently positioned experiences forge new political identities yet do so around territorializing logics and agendas. Urban satellite cities like El Alto now house informal workers, ex-miners, mestizos, and indigenous Aymara. This is not, as the liberal theorists of *mestizaje* argue, representative of some modernizing rupture with some generic indigeneity rooted in the past or in rural areas. Lazar (2008) describes how women still own land in the countryside and, more often than men, return to help with agricultural duties such as sowing potatoes and quinoa. In effect, they rely on rural strategies of survival, combining urban informal labor and rural subsistence work. These

women have built a multivocalic political identity that borrows from rural Aymara farming communities and Andean social organization and kin-based structures, but their political agenda is very much centered on their everyday struggles in urban, impoverished El Alto. These processes push analysts and activists to further decolonize stubborn dichotomies of rural and urban, individual and collective, or proletarian and peasant, which obstruct more creative political thinking about indigeneity, as well as emergent and alternative models of polity and economy.

Arturo Escobar (2008) has foregrounded such networks of territorialized and territorializing projects as central sites where the rethinking of the epistemological bases of production, sociality, and life are unfolding and which are critical to shaping ecologically and socially revindictory struggles of the twenty-first century. Community-based studies of these diversely territorialized movements—some operating from “traditional” areas of occupation, as with much of lowland Bolivia, others mobilizing from marginal spaces that are the product of displacement and dispossession or migration—have rightly highlighted the importance of materiality and territoriality, in both political and analytical terms. Yet, there are also risks in the localization of politics—or the romanticization of locality—which can lead to what Michael Watts (2004), in the distinct case of Nigerian oil politics, refers to as the breakdown of wider secular nation-building frames. The risk is present in Bolivia, where territorializing projects are targeted for appropriation and containment by defenders of the status quo, especially within the framework of regionalism. Localist projects also raise the possibility of the mobilization of new languages of racialized exclusion, the purification of place-specific rights to belonging, and forms of ethnic or social cleansing. On the one hand, some indigenous visions in the Andes speak of displacing the “mestizo” (see Mamani Ramirez, chapter 2, this volume), whereas, more frequently, nonindigenous provincial and regional elites stake their claims to power on birthrights that delimit citizenship rights and seek to contain and exclude that deemed an indigenous, primitivist threat (as discussed by Soruco Sologuren, chapter 4, this volume). We must analytically distinguish, therefore, models of localist politics that maintain an openness to articulation in tandem with alternative models of production, exchange, and distribution that contest the logics of extraction and accumulation, from models of equally localizing politics that retrench systems of extraction, exploitation, and accumulation. The distinction is crucial when speaking of relations between place, territory, and movement agendas and between these and the possibility of rethinking the wider (pluri)nation-state itself.

The territorializing and rearticulation of movements, old and new, can thus be seen as a wider set of counter movements (Polanyi 1944) that must

be read across scales and forms of articulation as much as through local frames. These counter movements consist of a range of ideologies, from social justice frameworks and an environmentalism of the poor (Bebbington 2009) to movements concerned with increased state access to and control over natural resources (see Escobar 2008; Peluso and Watts 2001; Watts and Peet 1996). Among others, geographers have highlighted the creative work of these movements, which do not simply occupy space as territorial conquest or seek to capture stable institutions of power but which mobilize within and through territorializing projects to transform society by reimagining links to territory. As Raul Zibechi describes it, these movements are in large part the product of the “social earthquake” generated by neoliberalism, the processes of deterritorialization that unsettled forms of “production, reproduction and territorial and symbolic orders,” followed by attempts to reconfigure, reconquer, and recover space. They represent an “active resituation of popular sectors, frequently located in the margins of cities and in rural zones of intensive production” (Zibechi 2003:185–186). This rebuilding of power from below, yielding networks of clusters and nodes that are undermining traditional power relations, is ripe for engagement with a wider MAS strategy to “articulate pluralities” (Prada 2007), even though they are not ideologically or organically united in party form.

We maintain here, then, a focus on these dislocations and reterritorializations among a variety of popular movements, as well as attention to how issues of territory, identity, and resources are brought into focus in relation to the particularities of more conventional approaches to indigenous rights. Bolivia, indeed, was the first country to adopt the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples into national law. As has been much celebrated, Evo Morales’s indigenous identity has generated its own “social earthquake” in Bolivia, creating, as Mamani Ramirez highlights in chapter 2, an irreversible turn toward the reconfiguration of Bolivian society and public life. A number of other recent volumes have examined at length the issue of indigenous rights in Latin America, in Bolivia and beyond (Dean and Levi 2003; Postero 2006; Rappaport 2005; Sieder 2002; Urban and Sherzer 1991; Varese 1996; Warren 1998; Warren and Jackson 2002). We do not pretend to replay here the debates over the legal definitions of indigeneity on the global stage, nor conceptualize our work as an evaluation of policies to judge whether these debates’ objectives have been achieved.<sup>9</sup> Such an effort would be premature, in any case. We do, however, seek to open space for a rethinking of some of these central and contested categories—indigeneity, territoriality, resources, and autonomy—and highlight emerging trajectories and risks as Bolivians mobilize on new terrains of struggle.

## Remapping Engaged Research: Between Detachment and Engaged Struggle

Anthropology has undergone self-examination and remapping in recent decades derived from its historical complicities with colonialist forms of knowledge production and its own decolonizing thrust. But it is still the case that institutional forms of academic knowledge production and circulation tend to replicate hierarchies of place, power, and voice. By the same token, transformative processes underway in Bolivia are pushing to decolonize knowledge production and relations of inequality by remapping territorial orders and redistributing rights to speak, know, and live well. We acknowledge the significance of these decolonizing moves by highlighting alignments (and distances) between the ethnographic venture and the processes on the ground. Just as grassroots organizers seek to remap the nation-state and disrupt hierarchies produced by extractive economies, we hope to remap knowledge production to disrupt traditional forms of research and open up spaces for new kinds of collaborations across the North–South divide.

In the case of this volume, such a remapping effort entailed a critical dialogue between US-based and Bolivian authors, movement theorists, and indigenous organizers. Many of these conversations and critiques are reflected herein—including our own eagerness to emphasize that we do not, by any means, propose a prescriptive remapping of Bolivia as a neo-imperial venture. More importantly, many of the volume contributors have collaborated with movements through on-the-ground relations of ethnographic knowledge production, exchange, and practice, which has influenced the ways in which they think about and reflect upon the changes occurring in Bolivia. After Dwight Conquergood, we seek to do the intellectual and political labor of finding out what it means to be “radically engaged and committed, body-to-body, in the field and in the academy...a politics of the body deeply in action with Others” (Madison 2007:827). The research and writing thus reflects how the remapping struggles on the ground intersect with local and nonlocal processes of knowledge production. This entails highlighting how academic knowledge filters into local fields of struggle at the same time that indigenous and grassroots concepts, epistemes, and visions nurture and transform academic practice, as seen in the space opened here for genres, languages, and registers of knowledge production that readers will easily recognize as distinct. Bolivia provides a distinctive opportunity for this approach because of the intensely reflective way in which activists and intellectuals, many of whom now occupy positions of state or movement power, fuse social analysis with cultural-political practice. This is a legacy of

Bolivia's history of combative intellectualism in opposition to technocratic neoliberalism, as well as the influence of indigenous-led critical and decolonizing thought. The Bolivian experience can potentially serve as inspiration for similar discussions across universities and fields of movement practice elsewhere in the world. Because we are moving toward an era of scarce resources and environmental degradation, our intellectual work must move beyond the academy and across our traditional disciplinary bounds. In these new times, the blind faith in techno-science and rationalist positivism as the hope for humanity must be challenged by a pluralist orientation to knowledge production and distinct visions of ecological and social challenges, within the academy and between the academy and its others. As indicated above, this knowledge dialogue is pursued here through an experimental component, the inclusion of textual and visual material in dialogue with the chapters. Drawn from indigenous and other voices of Bolivian society, these include multilingual excerpts from editorials, manifestos, testimonials, communiqués, and legal documents that serve, in a minimally mediated way, as expressions of knowledge at work. Such creative and performative "stuff" of culture and politics does not always fit into academic analyses or do so in ways that impoverish their performative power. We hope that the multiple voices and conversations in the volume reflect and inspire the opening up of new spaces for rethinking the future directions of the country.

## The Structure of the Book

The first three chapters shed light on wider frames of state and regional remappings of indigeneity and (de)coloniality. Pablo Mamani Ramirez (chapter 2) outlines this territorializing shift as an Aymara sociologist and intellectual, a view in which indigenous peoples—and a more diffuse expression of indigeneity—establish themselves within the state and through the multiple interstices and fractures of power in spectacular and quotidian ways, remaking the very fabric of Bolivian society. Mamani Ramirez's chapter, as much manifesto as analysis, may strike some readers as intensely charged. Yet, echoing del Valle Escalante (2009), who argues that Western intellectuals have long been licensed to speak in racialist and exclusionary terms about the indio, with their biases enshrouded in the language of science, Mamani Ramirez offers a distinct perspective on the present moment, one in which a kind of assertive indigenous reconquest of space is underway, a process that is, inescapably, deeply charged. Chapter 3 (Fernando Garcés) delves into some of the hopes and limits of this indigenous reconquest in the legal and constitutional arena of state–indigenous relations. One of the most significant dilemmas of the indigenous movement is its long struggle to inscribe robust self-determination rights in the constitution. Garcés examines this effort and

its dilutions, which were produced out of the negotiation between the MAS government and the right-wing opposition. In addition to offering an insider's account of an unprecedented historical process of alliance building between peasant and indigenous organizations, Garcés details how indigenous positions were transformed and translated—or excluded—from the country's new constitution approved in January 2009. Ximena Soruco Sologuren (chapter 4) examines the tragic massacre of eleven peasant and indigenous activists in Pando in September 2008. Soruco explores the event by juxtaposing the effects of dismantling traditional forms of power and subjectivity with a critique of the emergent language of individualist autonomy, which seeks to establish new forms of violent exclusion and negation of the Other. Each of these three chapters, in a distinct voice and register, is written from deep within Bolivian histories and struggles, evoking the intensely charged positionalities through which broader processes remapping the country are experienced, analyzed, and interpreted.

Following a photo essay including maps and images that illustrate the chapters and offer their own forms of “Envisioning Bolivia,” chapters 5 (Joshua Kirshner) and 6 (Carlos Revilla) take us into two very different urban spaces: Santa Cruz in the lowland east and El Alto in the Andean west. Here, territorializing projects and dilemmas of urban growth and inequality are tied to planners and politicians' attempts to contain Andean migrant subjects deemed dirty and threatening in Santa Cruz and to reclamations of rights by the marginalized communities of El Alto. As we look through the lens of markets in Santa Cruz and neighborhood movements in El Alto, we gain a better understanding of the complexities of indigeneity as it relates to transformations of daily life and public political relationships in two contrasting urban spheres. Whereas Santa Cruz elites seek to project an image of modernity and civilization through municipal campaigns aimed at controlling (largely Andean) migrants, El Alto organizers embrace the “dirtiness” or “disorder” of their city by focusing on structural and environmental inequalities as reasons to mobilize—dynamics that, in both cases, are marked by and generate new kinds of political tensions and conflicts over territorialities, writ large and small.

Chapter 7 (Nicole Fabricant) and chapter 8 (Bret Gustafson) similarly juxtapose two expressions of mobilization on the peripheries of the lowland east—one of the MST Landless Movement, the other of the Guaraní. Fabricant focuses on how the expansion of soy as creative destruction (the loss of jobs, destruction of natural and built environments, and ecological degradation) leads to a new politics of seizing and occupying latifundio land in the Oriente and emergent attempts to create small-scale farming cooperatives or agro-ecological communities. Gustafson considers the Guaraní

movement to reconstitute its nation and claim its own forms of indigenous “autonomy,” juxtaposing these efforts against those of its detractors on the regional stage. The chapter considers the prospects and limits offered within the new constitution’s dual approach to redistribution and recognition in the model of a productivist developmentalist state.

Chapter 9 (Charles Hale) discusses the volume and the debates it raises—political, analytical, and theoretical—surrounding the legacies of neoliberal multiculturalism, the intensification of racialized polarization, and the contradictions of the current political moment. Hale focuses on the racialization of contemporary struggles over resources, territory, and indigeneity while drawing attention to the risks of banal (multi)culturalism or a naïve embrace of “Indianism.” This call for thinking more deeply about race and the risks of culturalist projects—as well as confronting the racist reaction of right—converges with our own concern with the ecological and socioeconomic challenges posed by the paradox of abundant resources and increasingly fragile human livelihoods and natural landscapes. Rather than position this volume as the expression of a singular response to this challenge, we hope that the chapters and the multiple voices provoke critical reflections on the current complexities of Bolivian resource politics and point to future possibilities. We also hope that by mapping out models of engaged research, we can (in a very modest way) contribute to new forms of solidarity and research that confront the tensions and risks posed by the present moment. In a small way, following Hale, after Martin Luther King, this may help push the bending arc of the moral universe toward justice.

## Notes

1. The MAS was founded in 1998 as a heterogeneous alliance of social movements, left-leaning and nationalist intellectuals, and indigenous theorists and leaders. Here and throughout this text, we do not capitalize *indigenous*. It is sometimes common in English-language writing, especially when used as a legal category, to capitalize *indigenous*. We recognize the political significance of such usages as a reference to a shared historical experience of coloniality. However, in contrast to *Native American* or *American Indian*, *indigenous* is also a descriptive label that refers to a range of colonial histories and political relationships. We have chosen not to capitalize it to avoid imputing a generic racial, ethnic, or cultural essentialism and obscuring the particularities of distinct native peoples (Aymara, Quechua, Guarani, and others). This also avoids obscuring the distinct usages of the term in Bolivia, as discussed below.

2. Among others, see Wright 2010 for “lithium dreams”; N. Klein 2010 on Bolivia’s environmentalist challenge; and *The New Yorker*’s racist darkening of Evo (alongside Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hugo Chávez) in the issue of December 7, 2009. Against both sovereignty and indigeneity, Collier (2010), speaking in the name of a wealthy “we,” offers economic prescriptions to “manage nature for global prosperity.”



3. Ritual combat in which exchange, not defeat is the goal; also, an amorous encounter.

4. The Andes, in US-based national security policy, continues to be viewed as a problematic region, with implicit assumptions about the political threat of Andean peoples, by virtue of their (non-Western) ethnicities. This frame for production of “intelligence” about the Andes—which seems to view all change as inherently threatening—tends to fuse indigenous movements and the MAS regime with a panoply of other “risks.” Here, Andeanism is defined by “physical insecurity,” “risks” to democracy, “violent conflict,” and “porous borders that enable the easy movement of drugs, arms, and conflict.” Bolivia, in particular, is seen through this lens as a country “where almost everything is going wrong” (Council on Foreign Relations 2004:1–9, 10; see also Gamarra 2007).

5. Starn (1999:19–22) later qualified his critique as somewhat exaggerated in its portrayal of the contributions of an earlier generation of Andeanist anthropology.

6. This ongoing conflict led to the recent ouster of a much respected Vice Minister of Lands, Alejandro Almaráz. Almaráz, who supported collective territorial rights, was replaced by a proponent of individual tiling, and tensions now exist between sectors of highland Andean organizations and the lowland CIDOB, accused of demanding “too much land for too few people.” Paradoxically, this parcelization push from some sectors of the MAS (which contradicts Evo’s own statements, as in the interview following this chapter) echoes emerging neoliberal discourse on the “liberation” of indigenous peoples through individualized private property. As with the US Allotment Act in 1887, Bolivia’s own *Ley de Desvinculación*, 1874, and the 1952 Reform, the dogmatic embrace of private ownership led to *de jure* and *de facto* dispossession. For the neoliberal view in Peru, see De Soto 2010; on complexities articulating individual and communal holdings, Hvalkof 2008; on Bolivia, Almaráz 2010.

7. By *pachamamismo* we refer to a stereotyped set of (generally Andean Aymara) discourses defending the power of Mother Earth, the harmonious social order of indigenous societies, and protesting the sins of Western capitalism, modernity, and development. The reactionary right attacks pachamamismo as primitivist romanticism invented by Euro-American anthropologists. Although Bolivia’s new left is taking a decolonial and ecological turn, some left-leaning theorists also attack pachamamismo as an ethnicist or culturalist, if not reactionary, response to the challenges of capitalism (Stefanoni 2010). In contrast, for a classic if sometimes forgotten articulation of the Pachamama and militant politics, see Nash 1979.

8. The Water Wars unfolded in Cochabamba in 2000 as public resistance to a government attempt to privatize water delivery (Albro 2005; Assies 2003; Dangl 2007; Farthing and Kohl 2001; Finnegan 2002; Perrault 2006; Spronk 2007).

9. The land wars in the eastern region have been a backdrop to battles over water and gas (see Mendoza et al. 2003; Orduña 2001; Tamburini and Betancur 2001).

10. Two other recent collections include Grindle and Domingo’s *Proclaiming Revolution* (2003), which contains (mostly sympathetic) evaluations of the reformist policies initiated by the MNR during the 1990s. Crabtree and Whitehead’s *Unresolved Tensions* (2008) offers insightful macrolevel framings of current debates over the MAS project through a juxtaposition of polarized viewpoints. Save exceptions, in both collections the scholars are also politically “engaged,” albeit mostly from positions of power, distinct from the grassroots-level positionings we explore here.